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Abstract
This paper investigates parental time investment in children prior to formal schooling as a
source of intergenerational income persistence in the U.S. I develop a dynamic general equi-
librium model where lifetime income endogenously persists across generations through multiple
channels. My model replicates a series of important untargeted aspects of the data including the
U.S. income quintile transition matrix. I nd that the parental time investment channel accounts
for nearly 40 percent of the observed intergenerational income persistence. Policy experiments
suggest that e¤ective ways of improving mobility should focus on narrowing discrepancies in the
quantity and quality of parental time investments.
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1 Introduction
Empirical research has found intergenerational income mobility in the United States to be quite
low (Solon, 1999; and Mazumder 2005). A growing empirical literature on the sources of inter-
generational mobility, as reviewed in Black and Devereux (2011), suggests that a key determinant
of intergenerational mobility in the U.S. is family background. It still remains to be understood
which specic family factors are quantitatively relevant for low mobility and through what mech-
anisms such factors a¤ect intergenerational mobility. For instance, the e¤ect of parental income,
an obvious candidate, on child outcomes is often found to be weak (e.g., Blau, 1999; Sacerdote,
2007), suggesting that family income per se may not be a major source of income persistence
across generations.1 The answers to these questions are essential for designing policies to improve
intergenerational mobility.
This paper contributes to the literature on sources of intergenerational mobility by investigating
the role of parental time investment in children prior to formal schooling. Specically, I focus on
the time spent directly with children in interactive activities such as reading, playing, and talking,
all of which can promote development of a childs human capital in early years. Recent studies
have shown that more educated parents spend more time with their children (e.g., Guryan, Hurst
and Kearney, 2008; and Ramey and Ramey, 2010) and that active parental time inputs are of rst-
order importance for human capital development of children at early ages (Del Boca, Flinn, and
Wiswall, 2014). Moreover, it has been found that human capital gaps at the beginning of formal
schooling tend to persist throughout the childhood (e.g., Heckman, 2008; Cunha, 2013) and that
initial conditions of adult human capital around early 20s are crucial to account for lifetime income
inequality (e.g., Keane and Wolpin, 1997; Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron, 2011). As a result, the
early parental time investment channel could be an important source shaping how lifetime income
persists across generations.2
The analysis in this paper is based on a quantitative general equilibrium model with overlapping
1There is also empirical evidence that shows that income indeed has positive e¤ects on childrens test scores (Dahl
and Lochner, 2012). Heckman and Mosso (2014) review the literature on determinants of human capital development
and argue that the overall empirical evidence for the importance of income and credit constraints is not strong. See
Heckman and Mosso (2014) for more detailed discussions.
2See e.g., Knudsen, Heckman, Cameron, and Shonko¤ (2006); Cunha and Heckman (2007, 2008); and Cunha,
Heckman, and Schennach (2010) for evidence and discussions regarding dynamic complementarity; and Blau and
Currie (2006); Heckman, Pinto, and Savelyev (2013) for experimental evidence on how improving disadvantages in
early periods could have persistent e¤ects.
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generations and incomplete markets. In the model, altruistic parents care about their childrens
utility. Parents di¤er in their own human capital and assets as well as the human capital endow-
ment of their children and decide how to split their time across investment in their childs human
capital, market work, and leisure. The quality of the parental time investments is determined
by long-term family factors captured by the parents human capital as well as the childs human
capital endowment. Once children become young adults, they make their own college decision to
accumulate human capital. Parents can a¤ect this decision indirectly both through their parental
time investment at early ages, as the return to college depends on pre-college human capital, and
through nancial assets they transfer to their children. Adult human capital is subject to idio-
syncratic shocks, which cannot be fully insured since the only available asset is physical capital.
Households face not only borrowing limits in each period but also across generations since parents
are not allowed borrow against their descendantsincome.
I calibrate the model to the recent U.S. economy by minimizing the distance between target
statistics from simulated-data and their empirical counterparts. I then evaluate the model as a
quantitative theory of intergenerational mobility by examining whether it replicates a series of
important untargeted aspects of the data involving the distribution of intergenerational income
persistence. Although its calibration targets only a single intergenerational mobility statistic (the
correlation between the percentile rank of parents income and that of childrens income), I nd
that my model successfully replicates the most salient features of the U.S. income quintile transition
matrix. In both model and data, the intergenerational persistence of income is considerably higher
in the bottom and top income quintiles than in the second, third, and fourth quintiles. More
specically, in the U.S., the probability of children remaining in the bottom quintile when their
parentsincome lies in the bottom quintile is 34 percent, and the probability of children staying in
the top quintile when their parentsincome belong to the top quintile is 37 percent (Chetty, Hendren,
Kline and Saez, 2014a). In my model, these probabilities are 35 and 36 percent, respectively.
By contrast, the probabilities of intergenerational income staying in the second, third, and fourth
quintiles are 22-24 percent in U.S. data (Chetty, Hendren, Kline and Saez, 2014a) and 21-23 percent
in my model. To the best of my knowledge, mine is the rst paper to evaluate a candidate model
as a quantitative theory of intergenerational mobility by confronting it with the empirical income
quintile transition matrix, and to thereby establish its success in explaining those disaggregated
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moments. To further corroborate its use, I conrm that my model quantitatively accounts for other
regularities relevant to its key mechanisms, such as the widening gaps in human capital over early
periods and the positive relationship between college completion and pre-college human capital.
I use my model to investigate the role of the parental time investment channel in shaping the
intergenerational persistence of lifetime income. I nd that heterogeneity in the quantity of early
parental time investment alone can account for nearly 20 percent of the observed intergenerational
persistence of income. When I consider both the quantity and quality of parental time invest-
ments, I nd that the parental time investment channel can account for approximately 40 percent
of the observed intergenerational persistence of lifetime income. There are two main reasons for
the above ndings. First, despite their higher opportunity costs of time, it is parents with higher
human capital that choose to invest more time in their young children. This force amplies the in-
tergenerational correlation of human capital that would arise solely from the factors that determine
human capital at birth.3 This is because a child born into a family with high human capital benets
from parents more than a child with the equal human capital endowment born into a family with
low human capital due to both greater quantity and quality of parental time investment. Second,
because the parental time investment channel features dynastic smoothing, parents tend to invest
more in a child with a relatively low human capital endowment.4 This dynastic smoothing motive
moves children even closer to their parentsstatus, thereby raising the intergenerational correlation
of income further. The above two mechanisms imply that the children who are especially a¤ected
by their family background are able children born into low human capital families. The low parental
time investment they receive hinders mobility and aggregate e¢ ciency. I also examine the role of
the other channels such as college education in shaping the intergenerational persistence of lifetime
income. I nd that the college channel can account for slightly less than 10 percent of the observed
intergenerational income persistence. A key reason is that pre-college human capital, formed early
in childhood, is a signicant factor that determines the college education decision.
I also use my model to consider the e¢ cacy of a series of policy interventions designed to
3 In the model, the pre-birth factors may represent various factors including not only pure nature (genetic trans-
mission) but also assortative marital sorting and prenatal investment. The goal of this paper is to examine specic
channels such as parental time investment along with nancial transfers and college education in shaping intergener-
ational persistence while allowing for other channels in a parsimonious way.
4This dynastic motive to smooth the marginal value of human capital across generations is tantamount to the
innitely-lived householdsmotive to smooth consumption (or the marginal utility) intertemporally through savings.
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increase intergenerational mobility. I consider each policys implications not only for intergenera-
tional persistence estimates, but also for aggregate GDP and average welfare in order to evaluate
whether those policies that do reduce the intergenerational persistence of inequality are otherwise
desirable for the overall economy. In each instance, I take care to account for the implied changes in
equilibrium prices, as well as the additional tax burden required to nance the policy by satisfying
the government budget constraint. The rst set of experiments I conduct aims to facilitate access
to college by lowering college costs or relaxing borrowing limits. While these policies raise college
completion rates, I nd that they do not guarantee greater intergenerational mobility. This is be-
cause there is positive self-selection into college completion. Specically, since those who decide to
go to college even before the policy change tend to have higher pre-college human capital as well as
higher returns to college than marginal students, facilitating college access for marginal students
does not increase intergenerational mobility.
My second set of policy experiments aims to lower the opportunity cost of parental time invest-
ment toward encouraging parents to increase time investments in their children. These experiments
are motivated by the models prediction that children born with high human capital endowments
to parents with low human capital receive lower parental time investments than the average child
in such families despite their potential to accumulate human capital quickly and move up the in-
come ladder. I nd that a at subsidy to parental time investments can increase intergenerational
mobility because it disproportionately increases time investment in children whose parents have
low human capital and thus low wages. Those rises in mobility are accompanied by sizeable ag-
gregate output gains and average welfare gains. Finally, I consider a policy that approximates
universal preschool programs. Because this policy narrows discrepancies not just in the quantity
of time investments in young children but also in their quality, I nd that it delivers larger rises
in intergenerational income mobility and greater output and welfare gains than the parental time
investment subsidy.
In addition to the large empirical literature on intergenerational mobility and parental in-
vestment mentioned above, my paper is related to a number of theoretical studies involving the
intergenerational persistence of inequality.5 A growing literature investigates di¤erent sources of
5There are also theoretical studies involving e¢ cient parental investments. For example, Aiyagari, Greenwood
and Seshadri (2002) study e¢ cient parental investments depending on the market structure and altruism.
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intergenerational economic persistence using quantitative dynamic equilibrium models with het-
erogeneous households (e.g., Restuccia and Urrutia, 2004; Holter, 2014; Lee and Seshadri, 2014;
and Herrington, 2015). My paper is distinguished in this literature by the fact that the calibrated
model herein matches not only the targeted empirical correlation of income across generations, as
is standard in the literature, but also the non-targeted U.S. income quintile transition matrix, as
discussed above.
A second important distinguishing feature of my paper is its explicit focus on the parental
time investment channel, which has so far received almost no attention in the theoretical literature
involving intergenerational mobility to which my paper contributes. Lee and Seshadri (2014) is
the one exception that also models parental time investments explicitly. Their quantitative model
accounts for various aspects of data such as the intergenerational elasticity and cross-sectional
inequality, as does mine. Interestingly, their results suggest that the intergenerational elasticity is
largely a¤ected by parental investment, but is nearly una¤ected by innate ability transmission. My
paper complements the Lee and Seshadris analysis by stripping away channels other than parental
time investment to isolate its implications.6 It also reconciles the theory with a body of empirical
evidence suggesting that pre-birth factors are important to the intergenerational transmission of
socioeconomic status.7 Specically, unlike their results, my results indicate that pre-birth factors
are quantitatively equally as important as parental investments in explaining intergenerational
income persistence. The key modeling distinctions explaining our di¤ering results rest in a set of
assumptions involving human capital and adulthood market luck. Lee and Seshadri distinguish
innate ability (nature in their model) from human capital and assume that heterogeneity in human
capital arises in later childhood. By contrast, following Cunha and Heckman (2007), I do not
distinguish ability from human capital and model heterogeneity in human capital endowments at
birth. This proves to be a key ingredient for economic mobility in my model, due to parents
dynastic smoothing motives. The degree of intergenerational lifetime income mobility depends not
only on childhood events but also on adulthood through intra-generational mobility. Whereas a
one-time random draw resolves all adult income uncertainty in the Lee and Seshadris model, my
6Lee and Seshadri (2014) briey consider the role of parentstime investments in one experiment by altering the
human capital production technology in their model (Table 6).
7The empirical literature in economics, behavioral genetics, and sociology often nds that pre-birth factors account
for a signicant portion of intergenerational persistence. See Sacerdote (2010) for an extensive survey.
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model includes idiosyncratic shocks to human capital, period-by-period, over each adults working
life. This distinction allows my model to incorporate intra-generational mobility while achieving
greater consistency with the life-cycle prole of inequality in the data, and avoiding reliance on an
empirically questionable negative correlation between innate ability and market luck.
My paper is also related to the literature that uses equilibrium models of human capital in-
vestment across generations to study policies designed to raise human capital of children from
disadvantaged families (e.g., Fernandez and Rogerson, 1998; Caucutt and Lochner, 2012; Cunha,
2013). So far, this literature has concentrated on parentsinadequate nancial investments in chil-
drens human capital due to credit constraints. In contrast, my paper highlights the role of the
quantity and quality of parental time investments in improving human capital of children from dis-
advantaged families. Finally, my paper also complements the work of Huggett et al. (2011), who
show that di¤erences in initial conditions, especially human capital, at age 23 account for a large
fraction of lifetime inequality.8 My contribution is to endogenize the acquisition of human capital
before adulthood in order to examine how family-related factors and college education shape the
di¤erences in human capital in early adult life.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 explains how
the parameters of the baseline model economy are calibrated, and evaluates the baseline model
economy as a quantitative theory of intergenerational mobility. Section 4 presents the main quanti-
tative analysis of intergenerational mobility, and Section 5 provides results from policy experiments
designed to increase intergenerational mobility. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model environment
The economy is populated by overlapping generations of a continuum of households. A household is
composed of an adult who lives with a child until the child grows up. An adult lives for eleven model
periods (age 20-74) as an economic decision maker. One model period corresponds to ve years.
In Table 1, I summarize the timeline of the lifecycle events for a pair of overlapping generations for
illustration. An adult supplies labor beginning at period j = 1 (age 20) until retirement at j = 10
8Using structural estimation, Keane and Wolpin (1997) also nd that unobserved endowment heterogeneity at
age 16 accounts for 90 percent of the variance in lifetime utility whereas exogenous shocks to skills over the lifetime
accounts for the rest.
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Table 1: Timeline of the life-cycle events
Parents age
20-24 25-29 ... 45-49 50-54 ... 65-69 70-74
Parent Model age 1 2 ... 6 7 ... 10 11
Market work        Labor-leisure      ! Retired   !
Human capital College Parental
investment Time
Child Model age Birth 1 2 ... 5 6
Market work       Labor-leisure     !
Human capital College Parental
investment Time
(age 65). An adult lives for two periods after retirement and dies at the end of period j = 11: The
next generation is born when parents reach period j = 2: After 20 years, a child becomes an adult
head of a new household facing the same lifetime structure as described above.
Households di¤er in their human capital, asset holding and age.9 Human capital endowment at
birth is heterogeneous, partially depending on the parents level of human capital. Human capital
investment takes two forms: (i) parental time investment in young childs human capital prior to
formal schooling; and (ii) college education. Human capital may also grow due to the mechanical
channels such as primary and secondary education, and experience. While an individual works, her
human capital is subject to idiosyncratic shocks, as in Huggett et al. (2011). The capital market is
incomplete and the only available asset is risk-free physical capital on which the rate of return is r.
Thus the idiosyncratic shocks over the life cycle cannot be fully insured. The households recursive
problems over the life cycle are described in detail in the next subsection.
There is a representative rm which produces output with constant returns to scale technology.
Its production function is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas Y = F (K;L) = AKKL1 K where K
denotes aggregate capital, K is the output elasticity of capital and L denotes aggregate e¢ ciency
units of labor in the economy. Capital depreciates at the rate of .
There is a government that taxes labor earnings at the rate of w and capital income at the rate
of a. The revenue is used to provide social security payments to retirees and lump-sum transfer
9 In my model, human capital is composed of not only factors a¤ected by families and education but also ability.
This is in line with Cunha and Heckman (2007) who note Measured abilities are susceptible to environmental
inuences, including in utero experiences, and also have genetic components. These factors interact to produce
behaviors and abilities that have both a genetic and an acquired character.Therefore, I use the term, human capital
(or skills), interchangeably with ability.
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! to all households. The proportional tax rates, w and a, along with the transfer ! e¤ectively
provides an environment with progressive taxation that is found to a¤ect intergenerational mobility
(e.g., see Erosa and Koreshkova, 2007; and Holter, 2014). Government balances its budget each
period.
2.1 Households decision problems
This paper considers stationary environments in which all prices and aggregate quantities are con-
stant over time. Therefore, the time index for the variables is omitted and I present the households
decision problems recursively.
College education stage:
A child becomes an independent economic decision maker in the model period j = 1 (20 years
old) with a human capital stock of . As will become clear below, this level of human capital,
formed during the early childhood, is inuenced by the parent. An important decision to be made
at j = 1 is whether to complete college education or not. College completion requires both the
random physical cost  and the xed time input  . After observing the random xed cost draw
, households make a discrete choice regarding college education. The households value at j = 1
before the realization of  is given by
Vj=1(; a) = E max [ 0(; a); 1(; a; )] : (1)
where  0(; a) is the value without a college degree, and  1(; a; ) is the value of completing college
education.
The households value if the agent chooses not to go to college is given by
 0(; a) = max
c0; a0a1
n;l2[0;1]

U(c; l) + 
Z
Vj=2(
0; a0)dG(z0)

(2)
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subject to c+ a0  (1  w)wn+ [1 + (1  a)r] a+ !
n+ l  1
0 = exp(z0)
where c is consumption, l is leisure; w is the rental price of human capital per unit hours of work
(or market wage), a is the level of assets determined by the previous generations nancial transfer
decision, and a variable with a prime denotes its value in the next period. The households after-tax
earnings depend on the individual-specic wage w; hours of work n, and the labor tax rate w:
The capital return ra is taxed at the rate of a In every period, households receive a lump-sum
transfer ! from the government.
The level of human capital exogenously increases at the gross growth rate of  > 1 and is subject
to the idiosyncratic shock (or market luck) z of which the cumulative distribution is G(z): As in
Huggett et al. (2011), I assume that the z follows an i.i.d. normal distribution. Note that although
z is drawn from an i.i.d. distribution, its e¤ect is persistent over the rest of the life. This is because
z is not a shock to earnings but rather a shock to human capital, which essentially follows a random
walk with an age-dependent deterministic drift in logs.10
The value of completing college education after the realization of a xed cost  is given by
 1(; a; ) = max
c0; a0a1
n;l2[0;1]

U(c; l) + 
Z
Vj=2(
0; a0)dG(z0)

(3)
subject to c+ a0 +   (1  w)wn+ [1 + (1  a)r] a+ !
n+ l +   1
0 = exp(z0)( + ):
In my model, the benet of college education is represented by  > 0, an increment in the growth
rate of human capital. As described above, the college costs consist of the direct resource cost  as
10For example, taking the log of the law of motion for the human capital in (2), we get
log 0 = log  + log  + z0:
where a drift term, log ; acts as a deterministic trend.
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well as the time cost  , implying that the opportunity cost of college education includes foregone
earnings. The borrowing limit, faced by an agent whose age is j, is denoted by aj .
Parental time investment stage:
At the beginning of period j = 2; each household is endowed with a child. I assume that the
child shares the household consumption c and does not make time allocation decisions relevant to
the households economic status during childhood. The childs human capital endowment at birth
0 = (; ) depends on both parents human capital  and the idiosyncratic component . This
function  generates a positive correlation of the human capital endowment 0 with the parents
human capital : In other words, high human capital parents are more likely to have high human
capital children. The households state variables also include a, the level of asset holding determined
in the previous period. The value of the household at period j = 2 before the realization of  is
given by
Vj=2(; a) = EW (; a; ) (4)
The functional equation summarizing a parents decision problem after observing the childs ability
0 = (; ) is given by
W (; a; ) = max
c0; a0a2
n;l;h2[0;1]
s2f0;sl;shg

U(
c
q
; l) + 
Z
Vj=3(
0; a0; s)dG(z0) + 4Vj=1(c; ac)

(5)
subject to c+ a0  (1  w)wn+ [1 + (1  a)r] a+ !
n+ l + h  1
0 = exp(z0)
00 = f(; h; (; )); c =
 
00
c
ac =
2X
t=0
[1 + (1  a)r]t s
where q denotes the household equivalence scale,   0 measures the degree of altruism.
The intergenerational link is modeled following the dynastic utility approach in that parents
care about their childs utility, which depends on the next generations utility, and so on. This
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recursive structure linked by altruism combines successive generations as a single dynasty as in
Becker and Tomes (1986). In contrast to the standard Becker-Tomes type altruism, parents in my
model care about the childs utility derived not only from consumption but also from leisure since
the utility function is dened over both consumption and leisure. Note that, with a positive ;
parents invest their time in their child and have an incentive to make nancial transfers since they
care about the value of their childs life when she becomes an adult in 20 years, which is represented
by the last term of the objective function: 4Vj=1(c; ac). Optimal parental time investment h is
determined based on equating the marginal value of time in investment, leisure, and market work.
The production function 00 = f(; h; 0) describes how a childs developed human capital 
0
0
at age 5 is formed depending on parental human capital , parental time investment h, and the
childs human capital endowment at birth 0, in the spirit of Cunha and Heckman (2007). The
intergenerational human capital production function f(; h; 0) is assumed to have the following
properties: (i) f1; f2; f3 > 0; (ii) f22 < 0; and (iii) f21; f23 > 0. Note that the last properties imply
that the marginal return on parental time investment increases with parents ability (f21 > 0) and
childs ability (f23 > 0). The level of human capital after the primary and secondary school periods,
c; is assumed to be determined by a simple mapping c =
 
00
c .
For tractability, I assume that the parental nancial transfers decision is discrete and irreversible.
Specically, households are assumed to save an amount s 2 f0; sl; shg starting the next period
(j = 3) until j = 5. And the total amount of savings in this account is accumulated up to ac
(with after-tax interests) at the beginning of j = 6; which is then transferred to the next generation
that forms a new household. It is worth noting that this nancial transfer e¤ectively serves as
parental monetary investment inputs for college education later in childrens life since it can help
their college decision nancially.
It is worth discussing some modeling assumptions at this point. First, I assume that parents
can invest time in early periods while they can invest money for their childrens college decision.
This simplifying assumption not only lessens computational burden but also is reasonable given the
recent evidence by Del Boca et al. (2014) that, for the children under 5, active parental time inputs
are three to four times as productive as parental expenditures while, their relative importance is
completely reversed as children become older. Second, although the inter-vivos transfer decision
that helps nance college education is modeled, the decision on bequests is not. Abstracting from
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bequests actually provides a better mapping from the data to the model because most empirical
studies on intergenerational income (earnings) mobility including the empirical benchmark of the
current paper (Chetty et al., 2014a), use matched samples in which the children are relatively young
(around or above 30 years old), who are unlikely to be a¤ected by bequests.11
Remaining working stages:
Households keep making a typical work-leisure decision and consumption-saving decision for
periods j = 3; :::; 9 (age 30-64) until they are retired at j = 10. The household is composed of a
parent and a child until the end of j = 5 when the child forms a new household. Recall that a
parent who committed to leave the naicial transfer to the child keeps saving s while living with
the child. Therefore, the state variables at periods j = 3; 4; 5 include s as well. Once the child
becomes an adult, the parents decision to leave the transfer does not a¤ect their choice. Hence,
from period j = 6; the state variables do not include ac. The households problem in these periods
can be described recursively as
Vj(; a; s) = max
c0; a0aj
n;l2[0;1]

U(
c
q
; l) + 
Z
Vj+1(
0; a0; s)dG(z0)

if j = 3; 4; 5 (6)
subject to c+ a0 + s  (1  w)wn+ [1 + (1  a)r] a+ !
n+ l  1
0 = exp(z0)
Vj=6(; a; ac) = Vj=6(; a)
and
Vj(; a) = max
c0; a0aj
n;l2[0;1]

U(c; l) + 
Z
Vj+1(
0; a0)dG(z0)

if j = 6; 7; 8; 9 (7)
11However, it should be noted that it would probably be necessary to model bequest motives if one is interested
in intergenerational mobility of wealth since bequests play an important role in explaining the distribution of wealth
(e.g., De Nardi, 2004). This is left for future work.
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subject to c+ a0  (1  w)wn+ [1 + (1  a)r] a+ !
n+ l  1
0 = exp(z0)
Note that, although agents are not allowed to accumulate human capital endogenously after
period j = 1; their human capital accumulates exogenously at the gross growth rate of  > 1 until
j = 5. Thereafter, the growth rate stays constant at one. This structure parsimoniously generates
the shape of the empirical age-prole of wage that rises initially and stays at near the retirement
(see e.g., Rupert and Zanella, 2012; Casanova, 2013 for recent evidence).12
I assume that the borrowing limit right before the retirement (j = 9) is zero (i.e. a9 = 0). This
guarantees that households cannot borrow against their future social security accounts.
Retirement stage:
When households retire (j = 10; 11), they receive social security payments g(): This function is
increasing and concave in human capital (or wage) just before retirement in order to approximate
progressive U.S. social security in a simple manner. I assume that households are not allowed to
be in debt at the retirement stage. The value at the retirement stage is given by
Vj(; a) = max
c0; a00

U(c; 1) + Vj+1(; a
0)
	
(8)
subject to c+ a0  g() + [1 + (1  a)r] a+ !
and Vj=12(; a) = 0.
2.2 Equilibrium
Let xj 2 Xj denote the age-specic state space dened according to the households recursive
problems in the previous subsection. A stationary recursive competitive equilibrium is a collection of
factor prices w; r, the households decision rules aj+1(xj); nj(xj); lj(xj); h(x2); s(x2), value functions
Vj(xj) and age-specic measures j over xj such that
12The hump-shaped earnings prole observed in the data does not need to rely on the hump-shaped wage prole
since hours of work, endogenously determined by households, fall near the retirement, as observed in U.S. data.
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1. given factor prices, aj+1(xj); nj(xj); lj(xj); h(x2); i(x2); s(x2) solve the households optimiza-
tion problems dened in the previous subsection, and Vj(xj) are the associated value functions,
2. factor prices are competitively determined:
w = F2(K;L) (9)
r = F1(K;L)  ; (10)
3. markets clear:
11X
j=1
j
Z
Xj
ajdj +
4X
j=3
j
Z
Xj
"
j 3X
t=0
(1 + r)tsj
#
dj = K (11)
9X
j=1
j
Z
Xj
jnj(xj)dj = L (12)
where j is the fraction of households living in period j,
4. government budget balances:
G+ ! +
11X
j=10
j
Z
Xj
g(j)dj (13)
=
9X
j=1
j
Z
Xj
wwjnj(xj)dj +
11X
j=1
j
Z
Xj
arajdj +
4X
j=3
j
Z
Xj
"
j 3X
t=0
rtsj
#
dj
where G is non-negative,
5. the vector of age-specic measures of households  = (1; 2; :::; 11) is the xed point of
(X) = P (X;) where P (X; ) is a transition function determined by the household decision
rules and the exogenous probability distributions of z;  and ; and X is the generic subset
of the Borel -algebra B; dened over the state space X =
Q11
j=1Xj .
3 Calibrating the baseline model
I calibrate parameter values of the baseline model economy to match relevant U.S. statistics since
1990. There are two sets of parameters. The rst set of parameters is chosen externally without
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Table 2: Parameters chosen externally
Parameter Description or related target
 1:5 IES for consumption = 0:67
" 2:5 IES for leisure = 0:40
q 1:3 OECD-modied equivalence scale
 1:06 Lifecycle wage slope wj=9= wj=2 = 1:26
c 1:06 Change in std(log(h)) during K-12 = 6%
 0:26 Academic time spent by college students
w 0:27 Tax rate on labor earnings
a 0:4 Tax rate on capital income
K 0:36 Capital share
 0:3 Five-year capital depreciation rate
A 5:0 Output scale
m exp(0:5) Human capital scale
using model-generated data while the second set of parameters is determined jointly by minimizing
the distance between the statistics from the simulated-model and their counterparts from U.S. data.
3.1 Parameters chosen externally
I assume that all households have identical preferences over consumption c and leisure l, represented
by a standard separable utility function
U(c; l) =
c1 
1   +B
l1 "
1  ": (14)
The rst two parameters,  and "; in Table 2 govern the households preference. I set the value of
 equal to 1:5 so that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption is 0:67 and the
value of " equal to 2:5; which implies an intertemporal elasticity of substitution for leisure of 0:4.
The implied Frisch elasticity of labor supply is roughly twice as large as this value at the steady
state hours of work. These parameter values lie within a broad range of their empirical estimates.
As discussed in the previous section, when a parent lives with a child, consumption in the utility
function is replaced by c=q. I set q to 1:3 according to the OECD-modied equivalence scale which
assigns 1 to the rst adult and 0:3 to a child.
The gross growth rate of human capital in young periods (j = 1; :::; 5) is calibrated to match
the average wage growth over the lifetime. The choice of  = 1:06 implies that the average wage
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at j = 9 (age 60-64) is 26 percent higher than the average wage at j = 2 (age 25-29) if lifetime
idiosyncratic shocks are set to mean zero. This slope is close to the recent empirical evidence
on life cycle proles in Rupert and Zanella (2012). The slope parameter of the mapping that
governs changes in human capital during the primary and secondary education, c; is set to 1:06.
This implies that dispersion of human capital, measured by the standard deviation of log human
capital, increases by 6 percent during this period (Restuccia and Urrutia, 2004). In the model,
human capital investment in college education requires both time and resources. I set the time
cost  = 0:26 consistent with the empirical nding that academic time invested by full-time college
students is about 27 hours per week in 2003 (Babcock and Marks, 2011). The resource costs are
random and are discussed in the next subsection.
I set the tax rates on labor earnings (w) and capital income (a) equal to 0:27 and 0:40;
respectively (Domeij and Heathcote, 2003). The capital share in the aggregate U.S. data leads to
the choice of K = 0:36: The ve-year capital depreciation rate is set to  = 0:3. These parameter
values are within the range commonly used in the quantitative macroeconomics literature. I set
the two scale parameters to A = 5 and m = exp(0:5) where m is the mean of the idiosyncratic
component of ability at birth  which is dened below. These two parameters set the unit of the
output and human capital, respectively. The maximum borrowing limit is set to zero for all ages
in the baseline specication.
3.2 Parameters chosen jointly using simulation
Table 3 summarizes the remaining 14 parameters that are jointly determined by simulating the
model economy. These parameter values are determined as minimizers of the distance between the
relevant statistics from the data and those from the model-generated data (see Appendix B for the
details). I describe the role of these parameters in the model, and discuss how these parameters
linked to the relevant statistics summarized in Table 4.
Preference:
First, B is the parameter which determines the relative weight of leisure compared to consump-
tion. The relevant target is the average weekly hours of work: 41:3=105 = 0:394: Note that I assume
that the weekly feasible time endowment is 15 7 hours, excluding time for sleeping and basic per-
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Table 3: Parameters chosen internally using simulation
Parameter Description Functional form
Preference
B 0:361 Utility constant U(c; l) = c
1 
1  +B
l1 "
1 "
 0:939 Discount factor
 0:259 Degree of altruism
Human capital dynamics
1 0:633 Early human capital f(; h; 0)
2 0:498 formation technology = 0 + (h)1
2
0
0 0:176 Initial endowment (; ) = 01 0
 0:562 Idiosyncratic component log()  N(m ; 2)
z 0:171 Shocks to adult human capital z  N(0; 2z)
College education
m 1:17 College nancial costs log()  N(m ; 2)
2 0:897
 0:364 Human capital growth enhancement
Financial transfer
ah 1:97 Parental nancial transfer al = 0:5ah
Government
! 0:509 Lumpsum transfer
m 1:26 Social security g() = m log(1 + )
sonal care. All statistics regarding time-use are obtained from the 2003-2012 waves of the American
Time Use Survey (ATUS). The next parameter  is the households discount factor. This parame-
ter largely a¤ects the capital-output ratio, and the relevant target is the ratio of capital to annual
output, which is 2:95 in U.S. data (e.g., Huggett et al. 2011). The degree of altruism is governed by
: This parameter increases an incentive to invest time in the next generation. Hence, an additional
statistic is the unconditional mean of the parental time investment. To compute statistics regarding
parental time investment, I focus on sub-categories such as educational and recreational activities
for parents who have a child less than 5 years old (see Appendix C for details). This number is 6:3
hours per week or 0:060 (= 6:3=105) in the model.
Human capital dynamics:
I now move on to the parameters that a¤ect individualshuman capital dynamics in the model.
The intergenerational human capital production function is assumed to be
f(; h; 0) = 0 + (h)
120 ; (15)
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Table 4: Target statistics from U.S. data and the model-generated data
Target statistics Data Model
Average hours worked 0.394 0:393
Capital-output ratio (annual) 2.95 2:92
Average parental time investment 0.060 0:060
Educational gradient in parental time investment (hcol=hless) 1.35 1:35
Changes in human capital gaps from birth to age 5 2.0 1:97
Intergenerational correlation of percentile-rank income 0.341 0:341
Cross-sectional variance of log wage 0.40 0:402
Slope of variance of log wage from age 25-29 to age 55-59 0.18 0:180
Average college expenses/GDP per-capita 0.176 0:172
Observed college wage gap 1.75 1:76
Fraction with a college degree (%) 30.6 30:5
Average inter-vivos transfers/GDP per-capita 0.047 0:047
Post-govt variance of log wage/Pre-govt variance of log wage 0.60 0:600
Average social security replacement rate 0.40 0:401
which satises the three sets of assumptions discussed in Section 2.1. This adds the two parameters
(1 and 2) which govern productivity with respect to e¤ective parental time (h) and the childs
initial endowment (0). The rst relevant target statistic for these parameters is the gap between the
parental time spent by college-educated parents and that spent by less-educated parents. According
to the 2003-2012 ATUS data set, parents with a college degree spend 35 percent more time (7.6
hours per week) than parents without a college degree (5.7 hours per week). This educational
gradient of 1.35 serves as a target statistic.13 As for the other relevant statistic, I make use of the
changes in the distribution of human capital in the rst ve years. Specically, Cunha (2013) nds
that the gap in human capital, measured by the mean standardized skills by quartiles of permanent
family income, opens up at early ages.14 Figure 2 in Cunha (2013) shows that the gap between the
conditional mean of the second quartile and that of the third quartile nearly doubles between birth
and age 5. I use this change of the ratio as the other target for the early human capital production
technology parameters.
The initial endowment of human capital is assumed to be determined by
0 = (; ) = 
01 0 ; (16)
13Guryan et al. (2008) provide detailed evidence showing that this positive gradient is a very robust feature.
14The mean standardized skills is dened as the average of the normalized human capital (  E()
sd()
). The permanent
family income is dened as the discounted sum of parents lifetime income.
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so that the newborns ability c is the weighted average of their parents ability  and the idio-
syncratic component  in logs. Therefore, this setting adds a single weighting parameter 0. The
weight 0 largely a¤ects the degree of association across generations. I set the relevant target for
0 as the percentile rank correlation of family income of 0:341 (Chetty et al., 2014a), which has a
relatively stable trend in recent U.S. data (Chetty, Hendren, Kline, Saez, and Turner, 2014b). As
is common in the literature due to the data limitation, Chetty et al. (2014a) estimate intergenera-
tional persistence using the proxy income variable. The percentile rank correlation from the model
is also obtained from the proxy incomes equivalently dened (see the next section for the precise
denition of the proxy income).
The idiosyncratic component  is assumed to follow a log normal distribution: log() 
N(m ; 
2
): The idiosyncratic shocks to adult human capital z; following a normal distribution,
have mean zero with the standard deviation of z: z  N(0; 2z): Since these two standard devia-
tions,  and z, are the exogenous sources of the cross-sectional dispersion of wages in the model,
I choose the cross-sectional variance of log wage as a target statistic. It is important to note,
however, that, although the degree of wage inequality monotonically increase with both z and  ;
their economic mechanism is very di¤erent. This is because z a¤ects households over the working
life while  a¤ects the variability of the initial condition in human capital. For instance, holding
the overall dispersion of wage constant, in the case when z is relatively larger, households would
experience more volatile idiosyncratic shocks to human capital, the e¤ect of which accumulates over
the life cycle. As a result, the lifecycle prole of wage inequality would become steeper. Therefore,
I choose the di¤erence between the variance of log wage at age 55-59 and that of log wage at age
25-29 as an additional target to pin down the relative contribution of each shock process to the
overall wage inequality. These statistics on wage inequality in U.S. data for recent periods, obtained
from Heathcote, Perri and Violante (2010), are reported in Table 4.
College education:
In addition to the time cost already discussed, there are nancial costs following a log normal
distribution: log()  N(m; 2). For m; I rst compute the average ratio of annual college tuition
and required fees (excluding room and board) for four-year institutions to the per capita real GDP
for the recent periods 1990-2011, which is 0.22 according to the Digest of Education Statistics
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(2011, Table 349) and the Bureau of Economic Analysis. In order to approximate actual costs
faced by students, I also include the non-tuition expenses such as books, other supplies, commuting
costs, and room and board expenses that would not have to be paid by a person who chooses not
to go to college, as in Abbott, Gallipoli, Meghir and Violante (2013). These non-tuition expenses
amount to approximately 30 percent of the average tuition and fees. In 2000-2001, the average
grants (federal, state/local, and institutional) received by full-time students in four-year colleges
weighted by numbers enrolled are approximately 50 percent of the average tuition and fees. Based
on the above information, the target statistic for the mean of the college xed cost distribution m
in the model is set to be the equilibrium ratio of average (tuition and non-tuition) expenses after
nancial aid to per capita GDP, which equals 0.176.
The variability of the nancial cost distribution  is chosen in connection with the parameter
; which captures the enhancement of one-period human capital growth for those who complete
college. A greater benet of college (i.e., higher ) would obviously lead to more people who invest
in college education. Hence, a natural target is the four-year college completion rate of 30:6 percent
obtained from the ATUS samples. At the same time, this parameter  largely a¤ects the observed
college wage gap. However, it is important to note that the observed college wage premium is not
only because of the benet () but also because of compositional e¤ects due to positive ability
selection. In other words, an individual who is more able, measured by pre-college human capital,
is more likely to complete college and tends to have even higher wages after completing college. I
thus add the ratio between the average wage of those with a college degree and the average wage of
those without a college degree (1:75) observed in recent U.S. data (Heathcote et al., 2010), which
can pin down the variability of college costs  in the model.
Remaining parameters:
In the model, the parental transfers can take one of the three values f0; al; ahg. I set al = 0:5ah,
and calibrate ah to match the average parental transfer in equilibrium. Since the role of the
inter-vivos transfers in the model is to provide young households with nancial resources that help
complete college education, I focus on money from parents and college transfers and sum up these
transfers for ve years (from age 18 to age 22) from Table 4 in Johnson (2013). This leads to the
ratio of average parental nancial transfers to the ve-year GDP per-capita, which is 0:047; which
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serves as a target statistic.
There are two remaining parameters regarding government. The rst is the lump-sum transfer
!. As discussed above, the at tax rates along with this lump-sum transfer can e¤ectively provide an
environment with progressive taxation (Abbott et al., 2013). To measure the degree of progressivity,
I add the ratio between the post-government variance of log wage and the pre-government variance
of log wage as a target statistic (Heathcote et al., 2010). Social security payments are assumed to
be captured by a simple concave mapping: g() = m log(1 + ): A target statistics for m is set as
the average replacement rate of 40 percent in the U.S.
3.3 Evaluating the baseline model as a quantitative theory of intergenerational
mobility
Prior to the quantitative exercises in the next sections such as counterfactual and policy experi-
ments, this section evaluates the baseline model economy as a quantitative theory of intergenera-
tional mobility. I consider three measures of intergenerational mobility: (i) the IGE; (ii) the rank
correlation; and (iii) the quintile transition matrix. The intergenerational mobility estimates re-
ported below are based on family income in order to be consistent with the U.S. data counterparts
from Chetty et al. (2014a). Specically, in Chetty et al. (2014a), family income is the ve-year
per parent average of the pre-tax income dened as either the sum of Adjusted Gross Income,
tax-exempt interest income and the non-taxable portion of Social Security and Disability benets
(if a tax return is led) or the sum of wage earnings, unemployment benets, and gross social
security and disability benets (otherwise). In the model, family income is the ve-year per parent
sum of labor earnings, interest income, and social security benets. It is worth noting that family
income is the preferred variable for the studies of intergenerational mobility including both sons
and daughters (Lee and Solon, 2009), which applies to the gender-neutral model in this paper.
The model-implied statistics are based on 100,000 parent-child pairs generated by simulating the
baseline model economy.
IGE and percentile rank-correlation:
The rst is the IGE, a conventional way to measure the degree of intergenerational persistence in
the literature. The IGE is the slope coe¢ cient obtained by running the following log-log regression
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equation:
log ychild = 0 + 1 log yparent + " (17)
where y is the permanent income. The IGE provides a straightforward interpretation: a one percent
increase in parental permanent income is associated with a 1 percent increase in their childrens
permanent income. Thus, a high 1 implies low intergenerational mobility. The second way to mea-
sure intergenerational mobility is to use a rank-rank specication instead of a log-log specication,
as proposed by Chetty et al. (2014a, 2014b). In other words, I estimate the slope parameter after
replacing log income with the percentile rank of income within ones own generation in (17). The
slope coe¢ cient in a rank-rank specication (or the rank correlation) has a similar interpretation:
a one percentage point increase in parents percentile rank is associated with a 1 percentage point
increase in their childrens percentile rank.15 Unlike the IGE, the rank correlation is known to be
less sensitive to the treatment of zero income observations and is relatively robust to the point of
measurement in the income distribution (Chetty et al. 2014a, 2014b).
In the literature estimating intergenerational mobility, the biggest challenge is the data require-
ment: we need a data set which contains career-long earnings histories (or permanent income) for
at least two successive generations. Due to the data limitation, in practice, permanent income is
replaced with proxy income measured at a point in the life cycle. For purposes of comparison, I
present model statistics based on proxy income which is dened similarly to Chetty et al. (2014a)
in addition to those based on discounted sum of lifetime income. Specically, in Chetty et al.
(2014a), the childs income is measured by income when children are around 30 years old, averaged
over two years. The parents income is averaged over ve years when parents are roughly around
45 years old. Accordingly, in the model, the age at which the parents income is measured is 45-49
(j = 6), and the age at which the childs income is measured is 30-34 (j = 3).
Table 5 reports these rst two measures (i.e., slope estimates) from the model and the data.
The rst column shows estimates from U.S. data in Chetty et al. (2014a). Recall that the rank-
rank slope using proxy income from the model matches its value in U.S. data since it has been
used as a calibration target. The estimate of the log-log slope (IGE) using lifetime income is 0:377,
15Note that the rank-rank slope estimate is simply equal to the correlation coe¢ cient in percentile rank since the
independent and dependent variables, both of which are normalized by transforming the income level to the percentile
ranks, have the same variance.
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Table 5: Intergenerational persistence estimates
U.S. data Baseline model
Chetty et al Proxy income Lifetime income
(2014a) (discounted)
IGE: log-log slope 0.344 0.320 0.377
Rank corr: rank-rank slope 0.341 0.341 0.361
Notes: I simulate 100,000 pairs of a parent and a child for the model-generated data. The log-log slope estimate
is obtained from a univariate regression equation where the dependent variable is the childs log income and the
independent variable is the parents log income. The rank-rank slope estimate is obtained from an equivalent regression
equation replacing log transformation with the percentile rank.
which is greater than the estimate of 0:320 using proxy income. This is in line with ndings in the
empirical studies noting that the short-term income (even multi-year averages) may not represent
the permanent income because of persistent transitory shocks.16 The bias is noticeably smaller
in the estimate of the rank-rank slope using proxy income instead of lifetime income (0:341 and
0:361).
It is important to note that the degree of approximation using the proxy income depends on
the point at which income is measured, as can be seen in Figure 1. In this gure, I plot the
estimates of the IGE (left panel) and the rank correlation (right panel) by varying the age at which
childrens income is measured while holding constant the age at which parentsincome is measured
at 40-44 (red solid) or at 45-49 (green dashed). As documented in the literature (Solon, 1999;
Haider and Solon, 2006), there is serious attenuation bias in the IGE estimates when childrens
income is measured too early. The left panel shows that the IGE estimate when childrens income
is measured in the early 20s is less than half the true value using the lifetime income (black dotted
line). The IGE estimates become stable once the childrens age is over 30. The rank correlation
estimates show similar patterns with the two key di¤erences. First, the absolute magnitude of the
attenuation bias is smaller. Second, the rank correlation moderately declines with the age at which
childrens income is measured. This pattern is also present in Chetty et al. (2014a)s Figure III
using the SOI (the Statistics of Income) sample. Appendix A provides this so-called lifecycle bias
in the intergenerational mobility estimates for every combination of the parent and child ages.
16Another issue, which I do not consider in this paper, is the classical measurement error leading to attenuation
bias when parentsincome is measured with error. Solon (1992) suggests using the multi-year averages to mitigate the
errors-in-variables bias. This widely known issue is not considered because the model-generated data are accurately
measured without measurement error.
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Figure 1: Lifecycle bias by age of child
Notes: In both panels, I vary the age at which childrens income is measured while holding the age at which parents
income is measured constant at 40-44 (red solid line) or at 45-49 (green dashed line). The left panel shows the IGE
estimates and the right panel shows the rank correlation estimates. The black dotted lines show the corresponding
estimates using the actual lifetime income.
Quintile transition matrix:
The third measure I consider is the income quintile transition matrix. The (a; b) element of
the matrix gives the conditional probability that a childs lifetime income is in the a-th quintile
of his generations distribution, given that his parents income is in the b-th quintile of her own
generations distribution. This provides a richer description of how economic status is transmitted
across generations than do the rst two measures. It is important to emphasize that calibration
targets do not include any elements in the income quintile transition matrix.
Table 6 compares the transition matrix obtained from U.S. data (Chetty et al. 2014) to the
transition matrices using the model-generated data. Three features are worth noting in the transi-
tion matrix from U.S. data. First, it shows that the observed positive correlation of income across
generations (0:341) is not simply due to the intergenerational poverty trap but is also due to the
rich families that sustain their economic status intergenerationally. Specically, both the proba-
bility of children staying in the bottom (34 percent) and and that of top quintile (37 percent) are
substantially higher than the other diagonal elements (22   24 percent). Second, there is quite a
bit of mobility in the middle of the income distribution. For instance, children born into the third
quintile parents are almost equally likely to be located in any income quintiles (18   22 percent).
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Table 6: Income transition matrices: U.S. data vs. Model economy
U.S. data Model
Chetty et al (2014a) Proxy income Lifetime income
Parent Child quintile Child quintile Child quintile
quintile 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
1st .34 .28 .18 .12 .08 .35 .23 .18 .14 .10 .36 .23 .17 .14 .09
2nd .24 .24 .22 .18 .12 .26 .23 .20 .18 .14 .26 .23 .20 .17 .13
3rd .18 .20 .22 .22 .18 .20 .22 .21 .20 .17 .19 .22 .22 .20 .17
4th .13 .16 .21 .24 .25 .13 .19 .22 .22 .23 .13 .19 .22 .23 .23
5th .11 .12 .17 .24 .37 .05 .14 .19 .26 .36 .06 .12 .19 .25 .38
Third, both upward mobility, measured by the probability of moving from the bottom quintile
to the top quintile, and downward mobility, measured by the probability of moving from the top
quintile to the bottom quintile, are quite low (7:5 percent and 10:9 percent, respectively).
Overall, the model successfully accounts for the features in the U.S. income quintile transition
matrix despite the fact the calibration only targets the correlation of percentile income regarding
intergenerational mobility. In particular, the model reproduces the salient features of high proba-
bilities of staying in the bottom quintile (35:3 percent using proxy income and 36:1 percent using
lifetime income) and in the top quintile (36:0 percent using proxy income and 37:6 percent using
lifetime income). The model also predicts a substantial degree of mobility in the middle distribu-
tion. For instance, children born into the third quintile parents are almost equally likely to end up
with any quintiles (17  22 percent). Finally, the degree of upward mobility and that of downward
mobility are also low in the model although the model somewhat underpredicts downward mobility
(5:3 percent using proxy income and 5:9 percent using lifetime income compared to 10:9 percent in
U.S. data).
4 Sources of intergenerational mobility
In this section, I assess the quantitative importance of various channels in explaining intergenera-
tional income persistence, and inspect the mechanisms through which each channel a¤ects mobility.
To evaluate the relative contribution of the key elements to the observed intergenerational income
persistence, I consider special cases alongside the baseline specication. I rst focus on the role
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of the parental time investment, the key channel of interest in this paper. Then, I examine other
channels including college education, parental nancial transfers, and pre-birth factors.
4.1 Parental time investment channel
The rst two columns in Table 7 summarize the intergenerational income persistence estimates
(IGE and the rank correlation using lifetime income). The next three columns report the summary
statistics on the key endogenous channels in my model: (i) the average parental time investment
(hours per week); (ii) average parental transfers relative to the ve-year GDP per capita; and (iii)
the fraction with a college degree.
In the rst counterfactual case, denoted by (2) in Table 7, I eliminate this heterogeneity in the
quantity of parental time investment by imposing that all parents invest the same amount of time
at its average from the baseline specication (i.e., h = h). This is motivated by the substantial
educational gradient in parental time investment; the ratio between the amount of time investment
spent by college-educated parents and that spent by less-educated parents is 1:35 in the baseline
specication. As a result, both measures of intergenerational persistence, the IGE and the rank
correlation of income, decrease signicantly by roughly 20 percent. Note that, despite the homoge-
neous amount of time investment, the quality of parental time investment still varies depending on
the parents human capital (capturing parenting skills, the amount of useful information, etc.) and
the level of childs initial human capital endowment, thereby transmitting human capital across
generations. In the second counterfactual case, denoted by (3), I impose that all parents spend zero
hours of time investment. This essentially shuts down the overall parental time investment channel
since both the quantity and quality of parental time investment are not allowed to be transmitted
to the next generation. Compared to the above case (2), the intergenerational persistence estimates
decrease further (nearly 20 percent more). Overall, the parental time investment channel accounts
for approximately 40 percent of the observed intergenerational persistence of lifetime income.
It is worth noting that this quantitative signicance of the parental time investment channel is
obtained in the presence of the parental nancial transfer channel, a competing intergenerational
transmission channel. In the model, parental time investment (human capital investment) and
nancial transfers (physical capital investment) are the two channels that can substitute each
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Table 7: Importance of heterogeneity in quantity and quality of parental time investment
IGE rank corr h Average College
(hrs/wk) IVT/Y (%)
(1) Baseline 0.377 0.361 6.3 0.047 30.5
(2) Homogenous time investment at h 0.298 0.280 6.3 0.064 30.4
(3) No parental time investment 0.219 0.201 0.0 0.082 30.5
Notes: The mobility estimates are obtained using lifetime income from 100,000 pairs of a parent and a child. Row
(2) (homogenous time investment) exogenously imposes that all parents spend the same time investment at the mean
value from the baseline model (h = h): Row (3) (no parental time investment) sets h = 0 for all parents.
other.17 As can be seen in Table 7, although parents increase nancial transfers substantially
in the above counterfactual exercises where I impose restrictions on parental time investment in
human capital, intergenerational persistence estimates drops quite signicantly. This suggests that
the early parental time investment channel is quantitatively much more signicant as a source of
intergenerational income persistence.
To better understand the mechanism through which the parental time investment channel a¤ects
intergenerational association, I characterize properties of the optimal parental time investment
decision in equilibrium. A simple and intuitive way is to run a linear regression:
E [log(h)j log(); log(0); log(a)] = 0 + 1
(0:95)
log() + 2
( 0:76)
log(0) + 3
(0:0072)
log(a) (18)
where  is parents human capital, 0 denotes childs human capital endowment, and a is par-
ents assets using the simulated data. Note that, in the model, these regressors are parents state
variables, implying that coe¢ cients i can describe how the average behavior of parental time
investment changes with respect to changes in those variables according to the theory. I report
coe¢ cient estimates right below each parameter. Standard erros are omitted since they are very
small.
The estimated 1 is 0:95; implying that, holding childs human capital constant, parents increase
their time investment as their own human capital increases. Despite their higher opportunity
costs of time, it is higher human capital parents who invest more time in their children. Thus,
17Krebs (2003) shows that, in a general equilibrium environment, uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks to persistent
human capital tend to be positively related to physical capital investment, but negatively related to human capital
investment.
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Figure 2: Mean standardized human capital at birth and age 5, by quartile of permanent family
income
this property of the human capital investment behavior acts as a mechanism that amplies the
intergenerational correlation of human capital. To quantitatively visualize this amplication, I plot
how dispersion of human capital, by parents permanent income, changes in early periods. Figure
2 shows the means of normalized human capital (such that each period human capital has mean
zero with a unit standard deviation) by the quartile of permanent family income in di¤erent ages,
following Carneiro and Heckman (2003), Cunha and Heckman (2007) and Cunha (2013). It clearly
demonstrates that the parental time investment channel amplies the gap across the whole quartiles.
Note that as long as childrens initial human capital endowment is not strongly correlated with their
parents human capital, this amplication mechanism would generate substantial mobility during
this period.18 Figure 2 reveals that amplication is biased toward the top quartile, consistent with
Figure 2 in Cunha (2013).19 This indicates that this amplication mechanism could be responsible
for the feature in the income quintile transition matrix in the U.S. that the probability of staying
in the top quintile is greater than the high probability of staying in the bottom quintile.
18For instance, consider a case in which childrens human capital endowment is highly correlated with their parents
human capital. In this case, amplication would preserve the childrens rank and thus generate little mobility. In the
baseline model, this percentile rank correlation is positive (0:27) but still far from 1.
19Recall that calibration only targets the change of the ratio between the conditional mean of the second quartile
and that of the third quartile between birth and age 5, which is silent about asymmetry.
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In contrast to 1; the estimate of 2 is negative. This means that the amount of parental time
investment tend to decrease with their childs human capital at birth, holding the parents human
capital constant. This may seem puzzling since productivity of parental time investment does
increase with childrens human capital endowment. In fact, a key force that drives this tendency
is the dynastic smoothing of the marginal value of human capital, analogous to the consumption
smoothing of the innitely-lived households in a standard dynamic model. The di¤erence here is
that parents choose to invest in their childs human capital, which in turn a¤ects her future lifetime
consumption and leisure.
To see this more concretely, note that optimal parental time investment is characterized by
 
@U( cq ; 1  n  h)
@h
= 4
@Vj=1 (c; ac)
@c
@c
@00
1
1h1 120 : (19)
where the left-hand side represents the marginal cost of h (which is the negative marginal utility
of leisure) and the right-hand side summarizes the marginal benet of h. The marginal benet has
two components. First, additional time would develop the childs ability further (11h1 120 ),
which in turn would increase the initial adult human capital ( @c
@00
). This positive marginal product
of h in terms of adult human capital is captured by the whole second half terms ( @c
@00
1
1h1 120 ).
However, what is valued by parents is not the level of childs future human capital per se, but the
lifetime utility which their child would enjoy. Therefore, the rst half terms (4 @Vj=1(c;ac)@c ) trans-
late the marginal product of human capital into the present-value marginal utility which parents
actually care about. Note that, although the marginal cost of h (left-hand side) is independent
of the childs initial endowment 0, the marginal benet of h (right-hand side) may shift up or
down with respect to 0, depending on the relative size of the two e¤ects: (i) it may go up since
the human capital technology implies that marginal return on h increases with 0; and (ii) it may
go down because of diminishing marginal utility. In the baseline model, that the second e¤ect
dominates the rst e¤ect.20
In sum, parents dynastic smoothing motives imply that, when a childs human capital en-
20This result is somewhat in line with Bernal (2008)s empirical nding that mothers compensate less able children
by spending more time with them despite lower returns. The compensating nature of the parental investment (not
necessarily time investment) can be also seen in another context where parents care about inequality among multiple
children (Behrman, Pollak, and Taubman, 1982). Their setting is di¤erent from the current setting where parents
compensate their child who is born with a lower endowment relative to themselves, not among siblings.
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dowment turns out to be far from her parents socioeconomic status captured by human capital,
parental time investment plays a role as a channel that moves the child closer to her parents status.
It is important to note that parentsdynastic smoothing motives, interacting with the amplication
mechanism, give rise to even more mobility when parentshuman capital and their childs initial
endowment is not strongly correlated, as in the baseline model (0:27 of percentile rank correlation).
For example, when a high human capital parents child is born with a relatively low human capital
endowment, then the dynastic smoothing motives imply a even greater amount of parental time
investment. Hence, both high quantity and high quantity of parental time investment would move
this relatively low human capital child towards his parents high human capital status. A corollary
is that there are unlucky children born with a relative high human capital endowment into low
human capital families who would actually move down the ladder despite their potentials. This
can justify policies that attempt to improve parental time investment in disadvantaged families.
Finally, the estimated 3 is also positive, suggesting that more asset holdings do increase
parental time investment. It is worth noting, however, that its magnitude is substantially smaller
than 1. This has some implications for e¤ective policy designed to increase intergenerational
mobility, which I consider in Section 5.
4.2 Inspecting other channels
I now move on to the other key human capital investment channel, namely college education.
To quantitatively measure the importance of college education in accounting for intergenerational
income persistence, I shut down the college channel by imposing that there is no benet of college
education ( = 0). Row (2) in Table 8 shows that both intergenerational persistence estimates
decrease roughly by 10 percent. This suggests that college education does provide mobility but to
a lesser extent, compared to the parental time investment channel.
In the model, the discrete decision rule for college education features threshold-based behavior.
More specically, holding other things constant, the college decision rule is to complete college if
his or her human capital is above some threshold level. The reason is that the return to college,
which is accumulated over the life cycle, increases with their pre-college human capital level. On
the other hand, given a college xed cost draw, the marginal opportunity cost of going to the college
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Table 8: Inspecting other channels as sources of intergenerational persistence
IGE rank corr h Average College
(hrs/wk) IVT/Y (%)
(1) Baseline 0.377 0.361 6.3 0.047 30.5
(2) No college education 0.341 0.326 6.1 0.024 0.0
(3) No parental nancial transfer 0.383 0.367 6.6 0.0 29.2
(4) No pre-birth human capital transmission 0.224 0.211 5.9 0.087 29.1
Notes: The mobility estimates are obtained using lifetime income from 100,000 pairs of a parent and a child. Row
(2) sets  = 0 to remove the incentive to go to college. Row (3) sets ah= al= 0: Row (4) sets a0= 0 so that
childrens endowment of human capital is independent of their parents human capital.
(i.e., foregone earnings) is relatively small because young households tend to have lower wages.21
This property of the college decision rule leads to positive selection in equilibrium, meaning that a
better prepared student is more likely to complete college education.
To visualize the quantitative importance of college readiness that exists in the model, in Figure
3, I present college completion probabilities by the quintiles of the equilibrium pre-college human
capital distribution. The data counterparts are college completion probabilities by both cognitive
factors and non-cognitive factors in Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua (2006).22 Figure 3 shows that
high human capital students are more likely to complete college, indicating positive selection into
college both in the model and the data. Since the slope captures the strength of positive-selection,
it is worth checking if the model produces a reasonable degree of the selection. Indeed, although
not directly targeted in the calibration procedure, the degree of positive selection in the model is
very close to that in the data (especially of cognitive factors).
A consequence of this property is that the college channel tends to endogenously sort out those
who have relatively higher human capital, amplifying di¤erences in pre-college human capital. In
Figure 4, I plot dispersion of human capital, measured by Gini index, at di¤erent ages. In line
with the nding by Restuccia and Urrutia (2004), there is a signicant jump in dispersion of
human capital during the college education period. Note that a big increase is more likely when
21 In reality, merit-based scholarship could make the college cost smaller for the people with higher ability. This
would strengthen the importance of human capital in deciding whether to go to college. The e¤ect of need-based
scholarship may work in the other direction; however, this e¤ect is less clear since childrens ability is not perfectly
correlated with parental income, which is typically a criterion for such scholarship.
22The data set in Heckman et al. (2006) has a lower unconditional college completion rate. To focus on the
slope rather than the level, I adjust the model-implied college completion probability curve by the magnitude of the
di¤erence in the unconditional college completion rate.
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Figure 3: College completion rates by human capital quintiles
amplication is accompanied with litte rank reversals. In fact, this is in sharp contrast to the
parental time investment channel, which also features amplication but provides a great deal of
mobility. All of the above results suggest that college education would not serve an e¤ective means
of raising mobility.
In this model, parents can also transfer money to their child when she becomes independent.
An important role of this transfer is to provide nancial help for their childs college decision. In
the third row of Table 8, I shut down the inter-vivos transfer channel by setting h = al = 0. First
of all, as expected, the college completion rate goes down because private nancial help is missing.
A surprising result is that intergenerational persistence becomes higher in this counterfactual case.
This is partially due to the fact that parents, who are not allowed to transfer money to their children,
choose to invest more time in young children instead. Given that the parental time investment
channel has a strong power of strengthening intergenerational association, this substitution towards
parental time investment actually raise intergenerational persistence.
Finally, the bottom row of Table 8 shows the case in which I set 0 = 0, making the stochastic
endowment of childrens human capital to become independent of their parents human capital.
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Figure 4: Changes in human capital Gini over the lifecycle
This shuts down all pre-birth factors capturing not only genetic transmission (nature) but also
any nurtural factors (e.g., prenatal investment) that could a¤ect the childs initial endowment of
human capital. Unsurprisingly, closing the pre-birth factors reduces intergenerational persistence
quite signicantly. This result is not surprising since nature, which could account for a signicant
portion of the pre-birth factors in the model, is often found to be quite important in explaining
intergenerational persistence of education (e.g., Plug and Vijverberg, 2003; see also Sacerdote, 2010
for a survey on the evidence by psychologists and behavioral geneticists as well). What is worth
pointing out instead is that the parental time investment channel alone has quantitatively similar
impacts on intergenerational income persistence as does the pre-birth factors.
5 Policy experiments
In this section, the baseline model economy is used to study various policies that can be consid-
ered as tools to inuence intergenerational mobility. I consider universal policies that can avoid
stigmatization (Heckman, 2008). It is important to note that the objective of these exercises is
not to provide accurate quantitative predictions of each policy. Instead, the main objective is to
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examine and illustrate desirable properties of e¤ective policies that can increase intergenerational
mobility. It is also worth noting that it would be more ideal to examine how policies would change
the degree of equality of opportunity instead of the observed intergenerational mobility. However,
equality of opportunity is not straightforward to dene and is di¢ cult to measure. Alternatively,
this section provides other measures of absolute mobility such as changes in aggregate output and
welfare gains along with the intergenerational mobility estimates, a measure of relative mobility.
That way, we could better evaluate policy changes that raise relative mobility by examining whether
those changes are accompanied by overall absolute improvement.
The rst set of tools intends to provide easier access to college. Next, I consider a set of hypo-
thetical policies that are designed to change the opportunity cost of the parental time investment
in order to raise the quantity of such investments. Lastly, I consider policies that approximate
the universal preschool program in order to improve both quantity and quality of parental time
investment. Note that results for the policy experiments in this section represent long-run general
equilibrium e¤ects in which prices adjust to clear the markets so that human capital investment
and savings interact with each other through changes in prices in the presence of persistent risky
human capital and risk-free assets (Krebs, 2003). All of the policies are designed not to exceed the
amount of government surplus to satisfy the government budget constraint.
5.1 Providing easier access to college
I consider two ways to provide easier access to college. The rst is to relax borrowing limits
up to $5,000 in j = 1 (the college education stage). The second is to lower the mean of the
college cost distribution m by $5,000 in the same rst period. I explore the equilibrium e¤ects
on intergenerational persistence (IGE and percentile rank correlation), aggregate human capital
investment (average parental time investment and college completion rates), the ratio of average
parental transfers to ve-year GDP per capita and aggregate output per capita. For illustration,
assumping that the annual GDP per capita in the baseline model is $50,000, a value close to nominal
US GDP per capita in 2011, all dollar values are approximately in 2011 U.S. dollar. I also report
welfare gains for the rst adult generation, measured by the percentage change in consumption
during the lifetime of the rst adult generation in the baseline model that makes them indi¤erent
to living in the alternative economy. It is worth noting that the consumption compensations, or
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Table 9: Long-run e¤ects of providing easier access to college
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline Borrowing Lower
limit relaxed college cost
IGE 0.377 0.377 0.377
Rank correlation 0.361 0.362 0.363
Mean parental time investment (hours/week) 6.3 6.3 6.4
College fraction (%) 30.5 31.8 32.1
Mean parental transfers to output ratio 0.047 0.046 0.048
Aggregate output changes (%) - +0.17 +0.50
First adult generations welfare gains
including utility from future generations (%) - +0.30 +0.55
excluding utility from future generations (%) - +0.24 +0.45
Notes: The unit of parental time investment is converted to hours per week. Output gains are measured by the
percentage change in the ve-year GDP per capita (Y) relative to the baseline specication. Welfare gains are
measured by the percentage change in the rst adult generations consumption during their lifetime which makes
them to be indi¤erent to living in an alternative economy. Each household is weighted by the utilitarian social welfare
function. When computing consumption compensations, the last row controls for the continuation values as in the
baseline models.
welfare gains, are based on the expected utility from the perspective of those whose adult life has
not begun yet. Thus, when the stationary distribution changes, the welfare gains could reect
changes driven by their higher initial adult human capital and assets. I also compute their welfare
gains while controlling for the values derived from the future generations in order to isolate the
required consumption gains of the rst generation with respect to the changes in their own lifetime
utilities.
Table 9 summarizes the results. In both cases, the college completion rates do increase quite
signicantly (roughly by 1:5 percentage points). However, a greater fraction of college-educated
population does not imply that intergenerational mobility improves. In fact, both measures of
intergenerational persistence slightly increase. The main reason is positive ability self-selection into
college, discussed in the previous section. That is, the marginal students tend to have lower returns
to college than those who are already in college. On average, this makes those marginal college
graduates to accumulate more of human capital only up to the point less than those who already
choose to complete college. This is consistent with one of the main ndings in the previous section
that the contribution of the college channel to intergenerational persistence is relatively small.
Both policies have positive impacts on the average welfare and aggregate output, driven by more
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Figure 5: Welfare gains of providing easier access to college, by quintiles
college-educated labor forces. However, the magnitude of welfare gains may di¤er across di¤erent
income groups. In Figure 5, I plot welfare gains by the quintile of the lifetime utility, measuring the
percentage increase in consumption of the households in the x-th quintile of the baseline economy
in order them to be indi¤erent to living in the x-th quintile of the alternative economies. It is not
surprising to nd that those who have higher pre-college human capital enjoy greater welfare gains.
The positive slope of these gains is in line with the above result that facilitating college education
does not increase intergenerational mobility.
5.2 Increasing quantity of parental time investment
The analysis in Section 4 has called for the policies that improve parental time investment in children
born into disadvantaged families since low quantity and quality of parental time investment could
be important sources of hindering mobility and aggregate e¢ ciency. To quantitatively examine such
policies, I rst move on to the policies that aim to increase the amount of parental time investment.
I consider three kinds of exercises that can lower the opportunity cost of parental time investment.
First, I consider a simple form of subsidy: a lump-sum transfer to the parents who live in period
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Table 10: Long-run e¤ects of improving quantity of parental time investment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline Cash Time Earnings
Transfer subsidy Tax
IGE 0.377 0.377 0.366 0.387
Rank correlation 0.361 0.362 0.351 0.371
Mean parental time investment (hours/week) 6.3 6.4 8.2 8.2
College fraction (%) 30.5 30.1 30.5 29.5
Mean parental transfers to output ratio 0.047 0.044 0.046 0.047
Aggregate output changes (%) - +0.04 +2.59 +1.83
First adult generations welfare gains
including utility from future generations (%) - +1.93 +4.15 +1.36
excluding utility from future generations (%) - +1.57 +3.36 +1.09
Notes: The amount of lump-sum transfer is chosen to be approximately $200 per month. The at subsidy for parental
time investment sh is set to be approximately $1 per hour. The labor tax is raised to induce the same increase in
the average parental time investment as in the case of time investment subsidy. Welfare gains are measured by
consumption compensations. See Table 9 for the details.
j = 2: The amount is chosen to be $200 per month.23 Second, I consider a at subsidy sh that is
paid proportional to parental time investment h. In other words, the resource constraint in period
j = 2 becomes
c+ a0  (1  w)wn+ [1 + (1  a)r] a+ ! + shh (20)
An important feature of this policy is that, unlike individual wage, this at subsidy sh is independent
of the parents human capital. Therefore, the same amount sh matters more for low human capital
parents. In practice, since time spent by parents at home is hardly observable, this policy should be
thought of as an approximation of subsidies to child care centers in which parents themselves must
present and interact with their children (e.g., a version of Gymboree Play and Music classes). Lastly,
I consider an increase in earnings tax rate w only in period j = 2. As shown below, this policy
serves as a benchmark that can also raise the amount of parental time investment by decreasing
the marginal benet of market work, but has completely di¤erent impacts on intergenerational
mobility.
23For example, as of 2013, South Korea introduced a policy that provides a lump sum transfer to the parents who
have a child of age 5 or less. In U.S. dollars, the amount ranges roughly from $100-$400 per month depending on the
age of the child and the use of day-care centers. Importantly, the subsidy is independent of the parentsincome level.
Also, Germany also provides child benets (around 200 euros per month) to all residents, depending on the number
of children. However, German government does provide extra amounts to low income families.
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Table 10 summarizes the results. The second column shows that the sizeable lumpsum transfers
barely change most statistics including intergenerational mobility.24 Note that, in the baseline
economy, higher assets cause parents to invest more time in their child (3 > 0 in Eq (14)).
That is, income e¤ect from lump-sum transfers could reduce hours of work, which in turn could
increase parental time investment indirectly. The above result shows that this indirect channel is
quantitatively insignicant.
The third column shows the case in which a at subsidy sh is set roughly to one dollar per
hour. It does increase the average parental time investment quite signicantly by 1:9 hours per
week, and both the IGE and percentile rank correlation fall noticeably by 3 percent. A benecial
by-product due to an increase in average parental time investment is a 2:6 percent rise in aggregate
output and even greater welfare gains, driven by higher quality of average human capital in the
labor force. In the fourth column, the earnings tax in period 2 is raised up to the level at which we
achieve the same amount of increases in the mean parental time investment. However, its impact
on intergenerational persistence is actually opposite, demonstrating aggregate statistics such as the
mean of human capital investment is not su¢ cient to predict changes in intergenerational mobility.
Why do the increases in average time investment have opposite e¤ects on intergenerational
mobility? Figure 6 demonstrates the key to understanding this di¤erence. It plots the conditional
mean of parental time investment by parents human capital quintiles in the following three cases:
(i) the baseline model; (ii) parental time investment subsidy; and (iii) higher earnings tax. Although
the e¤ect of (ii) and (iii) on the unconditional mean of parental time investment is the same (see
Table 10), they have di¤erent distributional implications. In particular, an increase in the amount of
parental time investment is much more pronounced at the bottom quintile in the case of the at time
investment subsidy. Since lower human capital parents have lower opportunity costs of parental time
investment (i.e., lower wage), they increase time investment in their children sharply with respect
to the same amount of the monetary incentive sh: This helps those children born into low human
capital parents that on average invest less time than high human capital parents. Figure 7, which
again plots disaggregated welfare gains, clearly shows that welfare gains are disproportionately
larger for the lower quintiles, particularly in the case of the at time investment subsidy.
24The exception is the positive welfare gains, which should be interpreted with caution since this may simply
represent the government surplus being not used in the baseline model.
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Figure 6: Parental time investment by parents human capital quintiles: baseline vs policies related
to parental time investment
Figure 7: Welfare gains of improving quantity of parental time investment, by quintiles
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5.3 Universal preschool program
The at time investment subsidy in the previous exercise is useful in demonstrating the importance
of improving the amount of time investment in children from disadvantaged families. In fact,
those children lack the other margin as well (i.e., the quality of such investments), of which the
quantitative importance is as signicant as the quantity margin (see Table 7 in Section 5). This
subsection broadens the kind of policies that can also improve time investment along the quality
margin as well.
For illustration, I consider a simple exercise that approximates a universal preschool program.
More specically, I assume that human capital accumulation in j = 1 (birth to age 5) follows
00 = c + (h)
120 + (
~~h)120 (21)
The only di¤erence here is the addition of the last term which captures the amount of extra human
capital development from the universal preschool.25 As children spend the same time with common
teachers in such preschools, the last term replaces the parents human capital and the amount of
time investment with a common level ~ and a common level of ~h, respectively. For the quality of time
investment, I consider two values ~ 2 f~m; ~hg where ~m is mapped to approximately $13 hourly
wage, which is slightly greater than half of the economy-wide mean wage. This is very close to the
mean hourly wage of childcare workers and preschool workers (except special education teachers
and teacher assistants) in the U.S., according the Occupational Employment Statistics survey of
the Bureau of Labor Statistics. For ~h; I increase the value of ~m by 50 percent to examine the
e¤ect of the quality improvement. Lastly, I set ~h as the amount of the rise in the mean parental
time investment in the case of at time subsidy (1:9 hours per week) from Section 5.2. This will
serve as a benchmark in this subsection. It is important to note that the amount of parental time
investment is still determined by parents who understand that there are now universal preschools.
In computing a new equilibrium, I account for the e¤ective labor supplied to the preschool program
using the sta¤-child ratio of 6 (i.e.,
 2
6
 R
~~hdj is subtracted from labor supply).26
25Baker, Gruber and Milligan (2008) nd that the introduction of the recent universal child care in Quebec had
some negative impacts on the childrens outcomes in terms of non-cognitive skills. The nature of the universal
preschool in this section is somewhat di¤erent in that it intends to provide shorter but more educationally-focused
child care.
26One could also assume that there is a separate competitive preschool sector with a technology which is linear
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Table 11: Long-run e¤ects of universal preschool programs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline Time Universal Universal
subsidy Preschool Preschool
(high quality)
IGE 0.377 0.366 0.362 0.358
Rank correlation 0.361 0.351 0.347 0.342
Mean parental time investment: h (hours/week) 6.3 8.2 5.9 5.8
Mean total time investment: h+ ~h (hours/week) 6.3 8.2 7.7 7.6
Mean parental transfers to output ratio 0.047 0.046 0.045 0.044
College fraction (%) 30.5 30.5 30.3 30.1
Aggregate output changes (%) - +2.59 +6.31 +8.19
First adult generations welfare gains
including utility from future generations (%) - +4.15 +9.63 +12.55
excluding utility from future generations (%) - +3.36 +7.71 +10.01
Notes: Each column is obtained using the following specications: (1) baseline; (2) at time investment subsidy; (3)
universal preschool; universal preschool of high quality (50 percent higher hourly wage). Welfare gains are measured
by consumption compensations. See Table 9 for the details.
Column (3) in Table 11 shows that the universal preschool program can decrease intergener-
ational persistence even more than the case of the at time subsidy (Column (2)). Column (4)
shows that, if the quality of the time improves by 50 percent (~h), intergenerational income per-
sistence decreases even further. These changes in intergenerational persistence are mainly driven
by the two forces. The rst direct e¤ect is due to the fact that the additional human capital ac-
cumulation is composed of the same teacher quality and the same amount of time inputs. Such
publicly provided time investments are particularly benecial to high human capital children born
into low human capital parents because these childrens high human capital endowment can ef-
fectively complement such public time investments. Second, the public time investments actually
crowd out the amount of parental time investment as can be seen from reductions in the total
time investment (h + ~h) in Columns (3) and (4) relative to Column (2). This partially loosens
the intergenerational transmission of human capital in early periods, substituted out by public ~h,
thereby reducing intergenerational persistence.
Finally, as a consequence of extra human capital investment, we can see that the universal
in labor only. Then, the above exercise of changing teacher wages can be viewed as the exercise of changing the
productivity of the preschool sector.
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preschool program increases aggregate output and welfare substantially. These large gains are
possible since the same e¤ective time investment ~~h from the universal preschool complements high
human capital children regardless of their family background. It is important to note that, since
~h was chosen to make comparisons with the time investment subsidy case, the absolute levels of
improvement in aggregate output and welfare should be not taken as the key messages. Instead,
the takeaway should be that improvement in the quality of time investment in early periods is
an important characteristic of desirable policies not only from the equality point of view but also
from the e¢ ciency perspectives as well. This is because those children with high human capital
endowments born into low human capital parents have potentials to constitute an e¢ cient workforce
if they receive a fair amount of quality time investments in early periods.
6 Conclusion
I have investigated parental time investment in children prior to formal schooling as a channel
through which human capital is transmitted intergenerationally in a general equilibrium, incomplete
markets framework that endogenously generates changes in lifetime inequality across generations. I
show that quite a large portion, nearly 40 percent, of intergenerational income persistence present in
the baseline model is accounted for by the parental time investment channel that transmits human
capital from parents to children. Importantly, around 20 percent of intergenerational persistence of
income is accounted for by di¤erences in the amount of time investments chosen by parents. I nd
that two fundamental forces of the parental time investment channel are that (i) it is the parents
with higher human capital who invest more time in their children, amplifying the gaps in early ages;
and (ii) parental time investment tends to be negatively related to childrens initial human capital
endowment (dynastic smoothing). The key policy implication is that able children born into low
human capital families are particularly adversely a¤ected by the parental time investment channel
since these children receive lower quantity and quality of parental time investment, hindering their
chance of higher education and thus upward mobility.
The policy experiments I examine in this paper show that facilitating college directly is not
an e¤ective way of raising intergenerational income mobility. Because of positive self-selection
into college, increases in the college completion rate tend to benet better-o¤ families more. In
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contrast, I nd that intergenerational income mobility can be raised by lowering opportunity cost
of the parental time investment. In particular, a at subsidy proportional to time invested in
children provides an incentive for low human capital parents to increase the amount of parental
time investment because the subsidy has a stronger e¤ect on parents with lower opportunity costs
of time. I also consider the e¤ects of universal preschool policies, which can reduce discrepancies
in the quality of time investments in early periods. I nd that this policy delivers even greater
intergenerational mobility because the universal preschool benets children with high human capital
endowments, independent of their family backgrounds.
The above results provide guidance in designing actual policies to promote intergenerational
mobility. For instance, a government policy which encourages parents to bring their young chil-
dren to subsidized child play centers has a potential to benet children who lack parental time
investment in early periods. Furthermore, it is important to note that the above exercises abstract
from the spill-over e¤ects of such centers to parental time investment. For instance, if parents
can (i) learn parenting while watching how other parents spend time with their children or (ii)
directly share valuable information regarding early education while spending time in such centers,
they could potentially increase their parenting quality at home as well. These spill-overs e¤ects
would strengthen the main idea that improving parental time investment in young children at both
quantity and quality margins would provide a better equality of opportunity for their adult life.
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Table A1: IGE estimates: life-cycle bias
Childs age
20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
Parents 20 .18 .28 .30 .30 .30 .30 .29 .29 .29
age 25 .33 .49 .53 .53 .52 .52 .51 .51 .51
30 .23 .36 .40 .39 .38 .38 .38 .38 .37
35 .21 .34 .37 .36 .36 .36 .35 .35 .35
40 .20 .32 .34 .34 .33 .33 .33 .33 .33
45 .19 .29 .32 .31 .31 .31 .31 .30 .30
50 .18 .28 .30 .29 .29 .29 .29 .28 .28
55 .16 .26 .28 .27 .27 .27 .27 .26 .26
60 .15 .23 .25 .25 .24 .24 .24 .24 .24
Notes: Ages denote the rst age of the ve year period at which lifetime income is measured.
A Lifecycle bias in the intergenerational mobility estimates
Table A1 reports the IGE estimates by varying the point (for both parents and children) at which
the proxy income is measured. Although the true IGE, estimated by using the discounted lifetime
income, is 0:377 as reported in Table 5, the estimates vary quite signicantly depending on the
timing at which income is measured. There are several systematic patterns regarding the lifecycle
bias. First, regardless of when the parents income is measured, the IGE estimates are seriously
downward-biased if the childs income is measured early in their life. For instance, when the
childs income is measured at 20-24, the IGE estimates are close to half the true IGE even if the
parents income is measured at old ages. This is consistent with prior empirical research that points
out attenuation bias when childrens income is measured at early ages (Solon, 1999; and Haider
and Solon, 2006). On the other hand, holding the parents age xed, the IGE estimates become
insensitive to a point at which childs income is measured as long as it is measured at the age of
30 or above.
In Table A2, I perform the same exercise with a rank-rank specication instead of a log-log
specication. Overall, we can see the right-skewed inverse U shape in the rank-rank slope as
a function of the timing at which childs (or parents) income is measured: that is, (i) there is
attenuation bias when either childs income or parents income is measured at early ages; and (ii)
the slope estimates rise sharply and then decrease gradually as the measured-age rises. A notable
di¤erence compared to the IGE estimates is that, holding the parents measured income xed, the
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Table A2: Percentile rank correlation estimates: life-cycle bias
Childs age
20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
Parents 20 .22 .30 .29 .27 .26 .25 .24 .23 .21
age 25 .35 .48 .45 .43 .41 .39 .38 .36 .34
30 .28 .40 .38 .36 .34 .33 .31 .30 .28
35 .27 .38 .36 .35 .33 .31 .30 .29 .27
40 .26 .37 .35 .33 .32 .30 .29 .28 .26
45 .25 .36 .34 .32 .31 .30 .28 .27 .26
50 .24 .35 .33 .31 .30 .28 .27 .26 .25
55 .23 .33 .32 .30 .29 .27 .26 .25 .24
60 .22 .32 .30 .29 .28 .26 .25 .24 .23
Notes: Ages denote the rst age of the ve year period at which lifetime income is measured.
rank-rank slope estimates rise sharply in the early 20s and then gradually decrease whereas the
IGE estimates are virtually at with respect to childs age after they sharply rise in the 20s. These
ndings are in line with Chetty et al. (2014a) who show that their rank-rank slope estimates rise
steeply in the early 20s and then steadily decrease after age 30.
B Determining parameters using simulation
A vector of parameter values ^ = (B; ; ; 1; 2; 0;  ; z;m; ;; ah; !;m) in Table 3 is jointly
determined using simulation. More specically, dene Mm() as the m-th target statistic obtained
from the model-generated data with the set of parameters ; and Dm as the same i-th target
statistics obtained from data, as dened in Table 4. Then ^ is the minimizer of the objective
function:
P14
m=1 [log(Mm()=Dm)]
2 : I use the downhill simplex method to solve this minimization
problem.
C Data
Statistics regarding time-use are computed using the 2003-2012 waves of the American Time Use
Survey (ATUS). To compute average hours worked and the fraction holds a college degree, I consider
both men and women and include those whose age is greater than or equal to 20 and less than 65.
To construct a variable of parental time investment in the childs human capital, I focus on the
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educational activities that requires the existence of both a parent and a child in a common space.
Such categories include reading to/with children, playing with children, doing arts and crafts with
children, playing sports with children, talking with/listening to children, looking after children as
a primary activity, caring for and helping children, doing homework, doing home schooling, and
other related educational activities. As the focus of this paper is time spent in children before age
5, the time investment variable is computed using households whose youngest child is less than ve
years old. For the time investment variable, I further restrict the sample to the households who
are not enrolled in school and whose age is between the age of 21 and 55 (inclusive), as in Guryan,
Hurst and Kearney (2008). For all statistics reported, the ATUS statistical weights are used.
Note that the parental time investment variable does not include the activity of physical care
for children, which accounts for quite a large portion of time. However, it is interesting to note
that, even with the denition of the parental time including the physical care activities, I also
nd a similar size of the positive educational gradient and it is robust to the parental gender as
well. Furthermore, I also broaden the denition of the parental time investment to include some
activities that have educational aspects but do not necessarily require the direct/active contact
between a parent and a child. Such activities are organizing and planning for children, attending
childrens events, waiting for/with children, picking up/dropping o¤ children, attending meetings
and school conferences for children, waiting associated with childrens education. The inclusion
of such educational activities that could have indirect impacts on the childrens human capital
development increases the mean by 14 percent but barely changes the educational gradient. The
time-diary survey also reports secondary activities and part of them may also include childcare.
However, since the childcare time recorded as secondary activities is expected to be less active and
the same hours may not be e¤ective as an input to the human capital function, I do not consider the
time of childcare recorded as secondary activities, and only focus on childcare activities reported
as a main activity.
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